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Grandfathering Under SEQRA:
How to Determine Which Actions
Are Excluded from the Environmental
Impact Statement Requirement
I. Introduction
The purpose of this note is to present problems in
applying the grandfathering provisions of New York's
State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)' and to
suggest use of a three-step analysis that should aid the
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and
local agencies in determining when to require compliance
with SEQRA.
Basic to the problem is an insufficiency in the definition
of a key term: "action." 2 The importance of an adequate
definition is that SEQRA and its regulations provide for
exclusion of certain "actions" from the environmental
1. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
Sections 8-0101, 8-0111(5)(a) and 8-0117 are commonly referred to as the
grandfathering provisions. See N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.2(n) (1982) (defines
excluded action as an action undertaken, funded or approved prior to the effective
dates set forth in the State Environmental Quality Review Act).
2. The N.Y. Admin. Code definition is cited in the cases and is the one referred to
in this article. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. It is based on the definition
set forth in the statute. Actions include:
(i) projects or activities directly undertaken by any agency; or projects or
activities supported in whole or part through contracts, grants, subsidies, loans,
or other forms of funding assistance from one or more agencies; or projects or
activities involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license,
certificate or other entitlement for use or permission to act by one or more
agencies;
(ii) policy, regulations and procedure-making.
N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0105(4) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
Section 8-0105 begins with the statement that "[u]nless the context otherwise
requires, the definition in this section shall govern the construction of the
following terms as used in this article ..." The problem with the term "action" is
that it is sometimes unclear from the context whether "action" means a statutory
action or an activity.
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impact statement (EIS) requirement if they occur before the
effective date of the statute. 3 In Northeast Solite Corp. v.
Flacke4 and Salmon v. Flacke,5 the DEC used contradictory
arguments in determining whether the activities
constituted actions and thus, qualified for exclusion.
This note describes the different categories of actions
under SEQRA, the applicability of the EIS requirement for
each category, and the effective dates for implementation of
the statute. The two cases presented demonstrate how the
courts have tried both a literal interpretation of the statute
and a "what-makes-sense" approach in their efforts to
properly apply the grandfathering provisions. The
appellate court's approach in Northeast Solite Corp. v.
Flacke is formalized and presented as a three-step analysis
for grandfathering determination under SEQRA.
II. SEQRA and the EIS Requirement for Certain Actions
SEQRA expressed "the intent of the Legislature that all
agencies...have an obligation to protect the environment..."
and "that all agencies which regulate activities . . . which
are found to affect the quality of the environment shall
regulate such activities so that due consideration is given to
preventing environmental damage." 6 To aid agency
decisionmaking, SEQRA requires an EIS on any action an
agency proposes or approves which may have a significant
effect on the environment. 7 For determination of what
constitutes an action, the regulations provide the following
definition:
Actions include:
(1) Projects or physical activities, such as construction
3. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0117 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
4. Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, 114 Misc.2d 313,451 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct.,
Albany County 1982), rev'd, 91 A.D.2d 57, 458 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dep't 1983).
5. Salmon v. Flacke, 113 Misc. 2d 640, 449 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct., Erie County
1982), rev'd, 91 A.D.2d 867, 458 N.Y.S.2d 755 (4th Dep't 1982), afrd, 61 N.Y.2d 798
(1984).
6. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0103(8), (9) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
7. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
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or other activities which change the use or appearance
of any natural resource or structure, which:
(i) are directly undertaken by an agency; or
(ii) involve funding by an agency; or
(iii) require one or more permits from an agency or
agencies.8
Some actions, however, are not subject to the EIS
requirement. An action may be excluded, or exempted, 9 or
determined not to have a significant effect on the
environment.
A. Excluded Action
An excluded action is one which is undertaken, funded, or
one for which substantial time, effort, or money was
expended, prior to the effective dates set forth in SEQRA. 10
The term "grandfathered action" is synonymous with
"excluded action.""
8. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.2(b)(1) (1982). Where actions involve activities,
it is impossible from the definition to separate the action from the activity. Without
the activity the action would not exist. It follows that subjecting the action to
SEQRA review subjects the activity to that review.
9. The terms "exclude" and "exempt" are specific in meaning. A problem in
interpretation could result if these terms are interchanged in briefs and judicial
opinions.
10. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.2(n) (1982). Amendments to the
Environmental Conservation Law provided that agencies maintain a list of
certified excluded actions. 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 252 §§ 9-14; 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 460 §
3. The procedure for including actions on the list is for a local agency to submit to
its chief fiscal officer a list of projects which the agency deems approved prior to
the implementation dates. The chief fiscal officer must then certify that
substantial time, work, or money has been expended on the project. Those certified
actions are not subject to SEQRA. According to the SEQR Handbook, see infra
note 11, an action absent from the list may be considered for inclusion regardless
of the time period, if the chief fiscal officer can substantiate the time, work, or
money requirement. The chief fiscal officer is the agency official who is specified to
have authority to review and certify the list.
Additionally, ch. 252 § 14 provides that where final approvals were obtained
prior to November 1, 1978, actions requiring the issuance of a permit are not
subject to SEQRA if they were neither planned nor supported nor identified by the
DEC as likely to require an EIS. The regulations define approval as a decision by
the agency to issue a permit or otherwise authorize a proposed project or activity.
N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.2(e) (1982).
11. N.Y.S. Dep't of Environmental Conservation, The SEQR Handbook, B-9
3
1983] GRANDFATHERING UNDER SEQRA
B. Exempt Action
An exempt action is one that does not require review
under SEQRA. Exempt actions are listed in the regulations.
The category includes criminal proceedings, ministerial
acts, maintenance or repair involving no substantial
changes in an existing structure or facility, actions which
are immediately necessary on a limited emergency basis,
and actions of the State Legislature. 12 It is the kind of
action, not the timing of the action, that provides the
exempt status.
C. Type I Action
An action determined to have no significant effect on the
environment is a Type II action. It does not require an EIS
or any other determination or procedure under the SEQRA
regulations.13
D. Phased Implementation
The requirement for an EIS became effective on different
dates depending on whether the action was planned and
proposed or supported by a state or local agency. September
1, 1976 was the effective date for actions directly
undertaken 14 by any state agency;1 5 June 1, 1977 was the
effective date for actions directly undertaken by any local
agency and actions receiving some form of funding from a
(1982). The handbook "is intended to provide agencies with a practical reference
guide to issues and procedures of" SEQRA. Id.
12. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.2(o) (1982).
13. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.13 (1982). The Type II determination is made
by an agency on its initial review of the action. Kinds of actions and sources of
additional criteria for Type II determinations are listed in this section of the
regulations. The list includes the repaving of existing highways not involving the
addition of new travel lanes, installation of traffic control devices on existing
streets, collective bargaining activities, and investments by or on behalf of
agencies or pension or retirement systems.
14. Directly undertaken action refers to an action planned and proposed for
implementation by an agency. N.Y. Admin. Law tit. 6, § 617.2(j) (1982).
15. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0117(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
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state agency; 16 September 1, 1977 was the effective date for
actions receiving any support from a local agency and
approved actions identified by the department as likely to
require an EIS;17 and November 1, 1978 was the effective
date for all other actions subject to SEQRA.18
Application of these descriptions of actions and
implementation dates is the basic issue in the two cases that
follow. Both cases involve the issuance of the same kind of
permit. In Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke,'9 DEC
considered the action to be one that required preparation of
an EIS; in Salmon v. Flacke,20 it did not.
III. The Application of Grandfathering
A. Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke
In Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, Northeast Solite
began producing lightweight aggregate2' at its Ulster
County, New York facility in 1961. The production process
involved on-site mining, crushing, and heating of raw
shale. In April 1976, the corporation started using
industrial solvents and spent lubricating oils as fuels for the
heating process. Areas for receiving, blending, and storing
the fuels and for storing generated industrial wastes and
heavy metals were located on the facility. The corporation
had received numerous Department of Environmental
Conservation permits. 22 These were prior to SEQRA and
therefore did not require an EIS.
16. Id. at § 8-0117(2).
17. Id. at § 8-0117(3).
18. Id. at § 8-0117(4).
19. Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, 114 Misc. 2d313, 451 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct.,
Albany County 1982), rev'd, 91 A.D.2d 57, 457 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dep't 1983).
20. Salmon v. Flacke, 113 Misc. 2d640, 449 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct., Erie County
1982), rev'd, 91 A.D.2d 867, 458 N.Y.S. 2d 755 (4th Dep't 1982), afrd, 61 N.Y.2d 798
(1984).
21. Lightweight aggregate is a building material used in the construction
industry. 114 Misc. 2d 313, 314, 451 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (Sup. Ct., Albany County
1982).
22. The permits issued to the facility included mining, state pollution discharge
elimination system, and air quality permits. Id. at 314, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
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In 1977, DEC regulations governing solid waste
management facilities were amended to apply to industrial
facilities whose manufacturing processes involved the
storage and burning of "non-conforming fuels" and the
generation and accumulation of industrial and hazardous
wastes. 23 The regulation required such a facility to obtain
permits (Part 360 permits) to continue its operation. 24
Because the corporation used and handled non-conforming
fuels, the DEC, in November 1980, claimed that the
corporation was required to obtain these permits. In May
1981, DEC commenced enforcement proceedings against
the corporation that resulted in its compliance. 25 After the
permit application was submitted to DEC, 26 it notified the
corporation that the facility was subject to SEQRA. DEC
required the corporation to prepare a draft EIS to complete
the permit application. The corporation sought to annul this
determination. The resulting litigation held in favor of the
DEC position. 27 The court found that because Part 360
permits were not required until February 1978, the
corporation's "activities were not actions within the
meaning of SEQRA until after the effective date of
SEQRA." 28 This subjected the action to the EIS
requirement. It also meant that an activity requiring new
agency involvement after SEQRA's effective dates was
denied appraisal as an excluded action under the Act's
grandfathering provisions. On appeal, the DEC argued that
the activity of the corporation was an action under SEQRA
in that it involved the issuance of a permit by an agency.
23. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, pt. 360 (1977).
24. Id.
25. Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, 91 A.D.2d 57,58,458 N.Y.S.2d 291,292 (3d
Dep't 1983).
26. The corporation applied for Part 360 permits for "the disposal by
incineration of some 10,000 to 40,000 gallons of waste industrial solvents per week
.. the storage of hazardous wastes in lagoons and disposal via long-term storage of
sludge." Brief for Respondent-Respondent at 14, Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke,
91 A.D.2d 57, 458 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dep't 1983).
27. Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, 114 Misc. 2d 313, 316,451 N.Y.S.2d 633,635
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The application for the permit was made in 1981. DEC said
that to be grandfathered, the actions must have been
approved prior to the effective date of SEQRA.29
Northeast Solite argued that it was exempt from SEQRA
because it had not changed its method of operation nor
made any material modification to the facility. The
corporation said its activities were maintenance or repair
and that Environmental Conservation Law section 8-
0105(5)(iii) provides that actions do not include
maintenance or repair. 30
The appellate court did not agree that the activities at
Northeast Solite were for maintenance and repair. 31 The
court concluded that activities involved in mining and
crushing shale changed the use or appearance of a natural
resource. 32 Nevertheless, it reversed the decision of the
supreme court.33 The appellate court held that since the
facility had existed and operated before SEQRA came into
existence, had continued to operate in the same manner,
and had applied for or obtained permits required for its
operation, it was "grandfathered" from the requirements of
SEQRA. 34 Thus, the court determined that it was the
facility which met the qualifications for exclusion. It
labeled as "patently irrational" the DEC argument that
grandfathering applied only to agency actions or facilities
with approval to operate prior to SEQRA when no such
approval was required. 35
Since the statute provides specifically for exclusion from
the EIS requirement of "actions undertaken or approved
prior to the effective date of this article," 36 the court held
29. Brief for Respondent-Respondent at 8-11. See supra note 26.
30. Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 11, Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, 91
A.D.2d 57, 458 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dep't 1983).
31. Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, 91 A.D.2d 57,59, 458 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292 (3d
Dep't 1983).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 60, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
34. Id. at 59-60, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 292-93.
35. Id. at 60, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
36. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0111(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
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that the date for the grandfather status was a date prior to
September 1, 1976, the effective date of the Act.3 7 By not
requiring an EIS for the Part 360 permit, the court signified
that if a facility had sought all the permits and other
approval required before the effective date of SEQRA, the
facility would not be subject to SEQRA for subsequent DEC
regulations. 38
B. Salmon v. Flacke
Salmon v. Flacke39 was first decided two months before
the supreme court decision in Northeast Solite Corp. v.
Flacke. Here, in contrast, the DEC was defending a claim by
the Supervisor of the Town of Sardinia 40 that the DEC had
violated its statutory duty by failing to require an EIS
before its 1981 issuance of an opera ing permit and a
variance to Chaffee Landfill, Inc. (Chaffee), codefendant.
Chaffee took over a facility that had been issued a permit in
1958 from the Erie County Department of Health. 41 That
permit covered the facility for the removal, collection,
transportation, and disposal of garbage, rubbish, and
refuse. 42 DEC issued to Chaffee a Part 360 permit for the
operation of a Solid Waste Management Facility. 4 3 It also
issued a variance 44 allowing for acceptance of Buffalo
37. Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, 91 A.D.2d 57, 60, 458 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (3d
Dep't 1983).
38. Id. It should be noted that excluded actions may be subjected to SEQRA
requirements if certain conditions exist. These conditions are provided in the
"ungrandfathering provisions" -of the statute. See infra notes 66-67 and
accompanying text.
39. Salmon v. Flacke, 113 Misc. 2d 640,449 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct., Erie County
1982), rev'd, 91 A.D.2d 867, 458 N.Y.S.2d 755 (4th Dep't 1982), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 798
(1984).
40. Sardinia is located approximately twenty-five miles southeast of Buffalo,
New York.
41. Salmon v. Flacke, 91 A.D.2d at 867-68, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56 (4th Dep't
1982), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 798 (1984).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Salmon v. Flacke, 113 Misc. 2d 640, 647, 449 N.Y.S.2d 610,615 (Sup. Ct., Erie
County 1982), rev'd, 91 A.D.2d 867, 458 N.Y.S.2d 755 (4th Dep't 1982), aff'd, 61
N.Y.2d 798 (1984).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/7
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Sewer Authority sludge with a substandard amount of
solids. 45
The DEC defense regarding the permit was that the
action was grandfathered because it already had prior
approval in the form of the 1958 Erie County Department of
Health permit. DEC argued that "[p]etitioner's restatement
of the benificent purposes of SEQRA does not change the
fact that the Legislature in enacting SEQRA excluded
projects from its review if a prior approval may have been
granted by a local agency." 46 The DEC defense regarding
the variance was that the action was an exempt action
because it was in response to an emergency condition. 47
The trial court disagreed with the grandfathering
argument. It noted that the health department permit
expired December 31, 1958, and that the nature and.service
of the landfill were substantially different in 1981 than in
1958.48 Also, the granting of the operation permit for the
solid waste management facility at the landfill did not occur
until after September 1, 1977. 49 The court quoted from the
regulations which exempt those actions "which are
immediately necessary on a limited emergency basis for the
protection or preservation of life, health, property, or
natural resources." 50 It stated that a variance permitting
the disposal of 200,000 pounds of sludge per day, six days
per week, for a period of four months could not be considered
45. See infra note 47.
46. Reply Memorandum for Respondents at 5, Salmon v. Flacke, 113 Misc. 2d
640, 449 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct., Erie County 1982).
47. Id. at 8-10. The sludge from the Buffalo Sewer Authority was unacceptable
under standard permit conditions because it did not contain enough solids. The
sludge dewatering equipment at the Bird Island Treatment Plant could not attain
a 20% solids content in the sludge. The Chaffee Landfill was considered the only
landfill in the area that could accept, in an environmentally sound manner, the
dilute sludge.
48. Salmon v. Flacke, 113 Misc. 2d 640, 644,449 N.Y.S.2d 610,614 (Sup. Ct., Erie
County 1982), rev'd, 91 A.D.2d 867,458 N.Y.S.2d 755 (4th Dep't 1982), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d
798 (1984)..
49. Id. at 644-45, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
50. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.2(o)(6) (1982).
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limited.5' The court held for the Town of Sardinia, voided
the November 1981 permit to operate and the variance on
the permit, and enjoined the landfill from receiving and
disposing of the sludge.5 2 The landfill operator appealed.
The Appellate Division reversed.53 It held, in part, that it
was not the issuance of a permit that constituted the
action.5 4 It found that the prior landfill activities for which
the permit was sought constituted the action. The court held
that the action was undertaken or approved prior to SEQRA
and was, therefore, entitled to exclusion.55 The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated in the
memorandum of the Appellate Division.56
IV. A Three-step Analysis
Under SEQRA not all actions require preparation of an
EIS. Determination of whether an activity is subject to
SEQRA may be accomplished by a three-step analysis:
whether the activity constitutes an "action", if so, whether
the activity is the type requiring review under SEQRA, and,
if so, whether the activity is within the effective dates of
SEQRA.
A. Elements of an "Action" under SEQRA
An "action" is a project or physical activity, such as
construction or other activity, which changes the use or
appearance of any natural resource or structure, and which
involves an agency.5 7 If an agency directly undertakes a
project or activity, or supports it in whole or in part, or is
51. Salmon v. Flacke, 113 Misc. 2d 640,646,449 N.Y.S.2d 610,614 (Sup. Ct., Erie
County 1982), rev'd, 91 A.D.2d 867, 458 N.Y.S.2d 755 (4th Dep't 1982), aff'd, 61
N.Y.2d 798 (1984).
52. Id. at 647, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
53. Salmon v. Flacke, 91 A.D.2d 867, 458 N.Y.S.2d 755, 756 (4th Dep't 1982),
aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 798 (1984).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Salmon v. Flacke, 61 N.Y.2d 798 (1984).
57. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0105(4) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); N.Y.
Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.2(b) (1984).
223
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involved in issuing a permit for it, that activity is an
"action" under SEQRA. "Action" does not include
maintenance or repair involving no substantial change in
an existing structure or facility or official acts involving no
exercise of discretion.5 8
A pre-SEQRA activity may be considered an "action"
once new agency involvement becomes required. The
"action" status may begin its existence at the time of
agency involvement. In Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke,
the activity was one that changed the use or appearance of a
natural resource and that involved agency issuance of a
Part 360 permit. It was an "action" under SEQRA and was
so held by the supreme court. The Appellate Division, Third
Department, discussed the corporation's activities and
included the regulations' definition of "actions" without
specifically concluding whether there was an action. 9 One
may infer either that the court concluded that there was an
action and proceeded with this three-step analysis or that
the court avoided such a conclusion. Either way, the court
concentrated on the activities at the corporation's facility
and on the timing of those activities essential to effectuate
the grandfathering provision. Whether the activity
constituted an action was not determinative of the outcome.
In contrast, in Salmon v. Flacke, the action status did not
begin its existence when new agency involvement was
required. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, was
satisfied that the "landfill operation was an action
undertaken or approved" prior to SEQRA. 60 The court held
that the supreme court erred in concluding that it was the
issuance of a permit under Part 360, and not the prior
landfill activities for which the permit was sought, that
constituted the action.6 1 The court did not address the issue
58. Id.
59. Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, 91 A.D.2d 57, 58-59, 458 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292
(3d Dep't 1983).
60. Salmon v. Flacke, 91 A.D.2d 867,868, 458 N.Y.S.2d 755, 756 (4th Dep't 1982),
afrd, 61 N.Y.2d 798 (1984).
61. Id. at 868, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
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of whether those activities were continuous and unchanged
since SEQRA became effective.
It should be noted that the Court of Appeals referred to an
"activity" rather than to an "action" 62 and recognized that
the appellant's activities plus agency requirements for a
permit equalled an action as defined by SEQRA. This is
important because the exclusion principle requires
recognition of whether a situation is an action.
B. Activities Requiring Review under SEQRA6 3
The regulations provide for initial review of an action to
determine as early as possible whether it is subject to
SEQRA. If the action is exempt, excluded, or a Type II
action, the agency has no further responsibilities under
SEQRA.6 4 Therefore, unless it is excluded, every action
which is proposed, funded, or approved by an agency and
which may have significant effect on the environment 65 is
subject to review under SEQRA.
The Act specifically provides that some actions are
excluded from the EIS requirement. The exclusions or
grandfathering clause applies to actions involving pre-
62. Salmon v. Flacke, 61 N.Y.2d 798 (1984).
63. Activities are arranged in three categories: Type I actions ... identify, for
agencies, project sponsors, and the public, those actions and projects that are more
likely to require the preparation of an EIS than those not so listed. N.Y. Admin.
Code tit. 6, § 617.12 (1982). Type II actions identify actions which do not have
significant effect on the environment and do not require an EIS. N.Y. Admin. Code
tit. 6, § 617.13 (1982). Unlisted actions mean all actions not excluded, or exempt, not
listed as a Type I or Type II action, or, in the case of a particular agency action, not
listed as Type I or Type II actions in the agency's own SEQRA procedures. Note
that in Type I actions, projects are distinguished from actions. It is presumed that
actions refers to activities and not to "actions" as defined by the statute, whereas
Type II actions are within the definition.
See supra note 2.
64. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 617.5(a) (1982).
65. The New York Administrative Code provides a list of criteria that are
considered indicators of significant effects on the environment. N.Y. Admin. Code
tit. 6, § 617.11 (1982). Exempt and Type II actions are types of actions that have
been determined not to have significant effects on the environment.
225
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SEQRA activities approved prior to the effective dates. New
agency discretion over these same activities constitutes a
definable action. However, a new action involving a pre-
SEQRA activity should not automatically "ungrandfather"
a previous action.66 It is the statute that provides the
conditions for ungrandfathering an action. SEQRA
provides that an action prior to the effective date will not be
excluded if it meets one of these conditions:
(i) In the case of an action where it is still practicable
either to modify the action in such a way as to mitigate
potentially adverse environmental effects or to choose a
feasible and less environmentally damaging
alternative, in which case the commissioner may, at the
request of any person or on his own motion, in a
particular case, or generally in one or more classes of
cases specified in rules and regulations, require the
preparation of an environmental impact statement
pursuant to this article; or (ii) In the case of an action
where the reponsible agency proposes a modification of
the action and the modification may result in a
significant adverse effect on the environment, in which
case an environmental impact statement shall be
prepared with respect to such modification. 67
The wording of subsection (i) demonstrates that the
legislature anticipated that some excluded actions would
have adverse or damaging environmental effects. This
statute excludes such actions unless it is "practicable" to
change them.
It should be concluded that SEQRA applies to activities
which involve agency discretion for their inception or
continuance when such activities may have a significant
66. Subjecting a grandfathered activity to SEQRA review when new permits are
required effectively ungrandfathers a previous action. If the legislature intended
that result, it was not clearly expressed in the statute.
67. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0111(5)(a)(i)-(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
The court of appeals decision in Salmon v. Flacke suggests that the new dumping
activities at Chaffee Landfill did not change the level of operation so as to
ungrandfather the prior action. 61 N.Y.2d 798 (1984).
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effect on the environment and, in the case of continued
activities, when they may be modified practicably. 68
C. Dates Subjecting an Action to SEQRA
It has been stated that the grandfathering clause refers to
the effective date of SEQRA rather than the phased
implementation dates.69 However, the Act was amended to
provide a phased implementation. 70 This was to give
government officials time to properly adjust their
administrative procedures. 71 It is, then, the phased
implementation dates that should be used to determine
whether SEQRA applies to a given type of action. Any other
interpretation would strip section 8-0117 and its
amendments of any meaning.
V. Conclusion
Grandfathering has been an issue in several cases since
SEQRA became effective. 72 The two cases presented
demonstrate the difficulty in determining what constitutes
an action when new permit requirements are involved. The
definition of action does not stipulate whether the permits
referred to in the definition include all permits regardless of
when they are first required nor does it stipulate whether the
68. This note does not address any problems inherent in agency issuance of a
permit for an activity that would require an EIS were it not a pre-SEQRA activity.
For example, this note will not address the problem of environmental damage
where it is impracticable to change the action, as described previously.
69. Northeast Solite Corp. v. Flacke, 91 A.D.2d 57, 60, 458 N.Y.S.2d 291,293 (3d
Dep't 1982).
70. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 460 (codified at N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0117
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984)).
71. New York State Legislative Annual at 199 (1976).
72. E.g., Rome-Floyd Residents Ass'n v. Oneida County, 93 A.D.2d 979, 461
N.Y.S.2d 654 (4th Dep't 1983) (challenge to approval of a resource recovery
system); Rye Town/King Civic Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474,442 N.Y.S.2d
834 (2d Dep't 1982) (challenge to a proposed office building); Appalachian
Mountain Club v. Flacke, 109 Misc. 2d 514, 440 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct., New York
County 1981) (challenge to DEC determination to amend tidal wetlands map in
area of proposed Westway construction site).
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projects and activities must begin after the effective date. To
solve this problem, the exclusion provisions of the statute
must supplement the definition of action. It is, after all, the
action that is grandfathered.
As new legislation is enacted which requires agency
discretion regarding existing facilities, the need will
increase for clear understanding of exclusion under
SEQRA. Appropriate application of the exclusion
provisions should limit litigation in this area.
Rochel Stein
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